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ABSTRACT 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are interconnected systems of wireless access 
points (APs) that provide untethered network connectivity for a group of users who 
require data, voice, and/or video communication.  The wireless access medium of a 
WMN makes it particularly vulnerable to attack and exploitation. We seek a method for 
quickly designing WMN physical topologies (i.e., the placement of APs) that are robust 
to the effects of electromagnetic jamming. 
The conflicting interests of a network designer and attacker in respectively 
maximizing and minimizing network performance make this problem a natural candidate 
for the use of game theory.  We apply the game theoretic defender-attacker-defender 
(DAD) methodology to the simultaneous routing, resource allocation, and coverage 
(SRRA+C) model of WMN performance to simulate the design, attack, and operation of 
a WMN.  Our algorithm and associated decision-support tool can quickly prescribe 
jamming-robust WMN topologies that minimize the worst possible damage that an 
adversary can inflict.  Our approach considers radio-operating characteristics, the relative 
importance of client coverage and network flow, and the effects of radio propagation over 
terrain.  To our knowledge, we are the first to use an algorithm with proven global 
convergence to design jamming-robust WMNs, and the first to apply the DAD 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are interconnected systems of wireless access 
points (APs) that provide untethered network connectivity for a group of users that 
require data, voice, and/or video communication.  Each AP has two radio devices:  the 
first connects to local client devices, such as laptops and portable digital assistants 
(PDAs); the second connects to other APs to create a backhaul network.  Communication 
between users on a WMN passes from a source client through one or more APs before 
reaching a destination client.  To function, APs require only a local power source, such as 
a battery or portable generator.  This property of WMNs make them well-suited to 
operations in austere environments, such as combat and humanitarian assistance disaster 
relief (HA/DR) operations.  See Nicholas (2009) for an introduction to WMNs. 
The wireless access medium of a WMN makes it particularly vulnerable to attack 
and exploitation (Pelechrinis, Iliofotou, and Krishnamurthy 2011; Mpitziopoulous, 
Gavalas, Konstantopoulos, and Pantziou, 2009).  Such actions may include passive 
eavesdropping and packet capture, spoofing trusted identities to gain unauthorized access 
to the network, injecting malicious code, or denial of service (DoS) attacks (Xu, Wood, 
Trappe, and Zhang, 2004).  Designers of WMNs employ various strategies to defend 
against such threats, including frequency hopping and spread spectrum techniques, 
filtering noisy connections, adjusting the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) threshold, 
implementing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and access control lists (ACLs), data 
encryption, and various other security protocols (Ståhlberg, 2000; Zhang, Zheng, and Hu, 
2009, pp. 115-118; Poisel, 2011, pp. 3-7). 
In this report, we consider a simple, but often very effective, method for a DoS 
attack.  In physical-layer denial jamming, constant jamming, or simply noise jamming, an 
attacker constantly broadcasts random noise on the same radio frequency (RF) channel 
used by the WMN in an attempt to overpower the friendly signal, thus degrading or 
denying use of the channel (Vakin, Shustov, and Dunwell, 2001; Xu, Trappe, Zhang, and 
Wood, 2005; Poisel, 2011; Pelechrinis et al., 2011).  Powerful commercial and military 
jamming systems are readily available, but this type of attack can be conducted with 
inexpensive equipment and little technological prowess, and can be very challenging to 
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defend against (Wood, Stankovic, and Son, 2003; Xu et al., 2004; Mpitziopoulous et al., 
2009, The Economist, 2011; The Institute for Engineering and Technology, 2013).  Even 
unintentional interference can be as harmful as an intentional attack (see, e.g., Cox, 
2007); hence, it is of increasing concern in both civilian and military operating 
environments (Caro, 2007). 
We seek a method for quickly designing WMN physical topologies (i.e., the 
placement of APs) that are robust to the effects of deliberate jamming or other 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) emanating from point sources.  We refer to the point 
sources of both intentional jamming and unintentional EMI as jammers.  Although we 
focus on the effects of brute physical-layer jamming, our technique can be generalized to 
any form of WMN interference in which network performance is a function of the 
distance between interference sources and WMN APs. 
The conflicting interests of a network designer and attacker in, respectively, 
maximizing and minimizing network performance, make this problem a natural candidate 
for the use of game theory, a mathematical representation of conflict between rational 
opponents (Myerson, 1991).  We adopt the game theoretic defender-attacker-defender 
(DAD) methodology of Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron, and Wood (2006), Alderson, Brown, 
Carlyle, and Wood (2011), and Alderson, Brown, and Carlyle (2014) to model the design, 
attack, and operation of a WMN.  We seek AP locations that minimize the disruption to 
client coverage caused by jammers, subject to constraints on network service and 
considering the effects of radio propagation over terrain. 
A. RELATED WORK 
Wood et al. (2003) describe a method of mapping the areas affected by physical-
layer jamming to avoid placing sensors in these denied areas.  However, they do not 
mention how a network engineer should minimize the effects of jamming if sensors are 
placed within a denied area.  Xu et al. (2005) observe, based on empirical evidence they 
gather, that common measurements, such as signal strength, may not be able to 
conclusively identify the presence of a jamming attack.  However, they find that devices 
that constantly jam (which we assume) are more prone to detection, and they develop 
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algorithms to improve the classification rate of jamming attacks.  The methods of both 
Wood et al. (2003) and Xu et al. (2005) could provide useful input to our problem. 
Ståhlberg (2000) and Lazos and Krunz (2011) each recommend several methods 
of increasing the robustness of wireless networks to attacks, including the use of 
directional antennae, frequency hopping and spread spectrum technology, lower data 
rates, fiber-optic backhaul networks, encryption and error correction, and frequency-agile 
control channels.  Neither specifically consider defensive placement of APs.  Xu (2008) 
examines the effectiveness of adjusting transmission power to avoid jamming; however, 
she assumes that jammers will operate at a fixed transmission power less than that of the 
Aps, while we make no such assumption.  Wood, Stankovic, and Zhou (2007) assume 
jammers will have the same capabilities as APs, but do not consider AP mobility. 
Xu et al. (2004) examine spatial retreats, i.e., moving APs physically away from 
the sources of interference, as a form of defense against a jamming attack.  Their model 
assumes that jammers are stationary; they minimize the damage done by this fixed attack 
by coordinating the retreat of APs from the effective range of the adversary’s jammers.  
Ma, Zhang, and Trappe (2005) create a network dynamics model based on Newtonian 
equations to describe the attractive and repulsive forces between mobile nodes in wireless 
networks.  Building on Xu et al. (2004), they examine spatial retreats as a method of 
avoiding the effects of jamming.  Their algorithm moves nodes away from the sources of 
jamming in such a way as to reconstruct a working network.  However, neither they nor 
Xu et al. (2004) consider jammers that could then move and attack the newly-configured 
network.  As Mpitziopoulous et al. (2009) observe, this type of defense is ineffective 
against an adversary that can again move jammers.  Our approach to building a robust 
WMN topology is similar to a spatial retreat in that the only defensive method we 
consider to minimize the effects of jamming is to place an AP somewhere else.  
However, unlike any of this previous work that focuses on static or random jamming, we 
consider WMN network design in the presence of an intelligent adversary who observes 
our network and then places the jammer(s) to maximally disrupt network performance. In 
this way, we seek network designs that will maximize robustness to the worst possible 
jamming attack, rather than defending against a specific one. 
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Thamilarasu and Sridhar (2009) also consider the use of game theory in modeling 
optimal jamming attack and detection strategies.  However, they do not consider the 
actions taken by a network designer or defender, and both they and Srivastava et al. 
(2005) consider only strategic-form games (wherein players move simultaneously), vice 
extensive form games (wherein players move sequentially) that we consider (Fudenberg 
& Tirole, 1991, pp. 3-4, 67-68). 
In our previous work (Nicholas & Alderson, 2012), we consider the task of a 
network designer who must quickly determine good locations for APs to maximize client 
coverage and delivered backhaul network flow, considering the effects of radio 
propagation over terrain.  That work adopts and modifies He et al.’s (2004) concept of 
power coverage to calculate client coverage, and builds on the Simultaneous Routing and 
Resource Allocation (SRRA) problem of Xiao et al. (2004) to calculate the value of 
network flow.  Our resulting model of WMN performance is the SRRA+Coverage or 
SRRA+C problem.  We use the DIviding RECTangles (DIRECT) sampling algorithm of 
Jones, Perttunen, and Stuckman (1993) to quickly find good solutions to SRRA+C (i.e., 
AP locations). 
Shankar (2008) similarly considers the deliberate placement of jammers by an 
intelligent adversary (called the attacker) to maximally disrupt network operation, which 
in turn is also solved using SRRA.  He solves the attacker’s problem by considering a 
fixed number of candidate locations for jammers and then exhaustively enumerating them 
to find the location(s) that maximally disrupt network performance.  In contrast, we 
consider a continuous space for jammer placement (and therefore an infinite number of 
possible locations). 
Our work can be viewed as a merger of the attacker-operator formulation of 
Shankar (2008) and the designer-operator formulation of Nicholas and Alderson (2012).  
As noted in Wood et al. (2003), overcoming the effects of jamming can quickly escalate 
into a costly game of one-upmanship, where the network designer and adversary are 
constantly trying to outmaneuver each other.  The application of the defender-attacker-
defender DAD game theoretic framework to our model can identify WMN topologies 
that minimize the worst possible damage that an adversary can inflict, avoiding such 
endless competition.  To our knowledge, we are the first to use an algorithm with proven 
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global convergence to design EMI-robust WMNs, and the first to apply the DAD 
framework to the problem of WMN design. 
In the next part, we describe our new jammer-cognizant SRRA+C model of 
WMN performance and our application of the DAD framework.  In Part III, we describe 
our method for solving the DAD-SRRA+C problem.  In Part IV, we run our model to 
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
We apply the DAD methodology of Brown et al. (2006), Alderson et al. (2011), 
and Alderson et al. (2014) to model the design, attack, and operation of a WMN.  In our 
version of this three-stage, sequential Stackelberg game (von Stackelberg, 1952), the 
defender-as-designer, or simply designer D, places a defined number of APs.  In the 
second stage, the attacker A, cognizant of the AP topology, places a defined number of 
jammers to disrupt client coverage and total delivered flow.  In the final stage, the 
defender-as-operator, or simply operator D, calculates client coverage and flow across 
the backhaul network (in reality, the operator is a routing algorithm computed by the 
APs).  We repeat this game over many rounds, allowing the designer to learn the best AP 
topologies.  The optimal solution to our DAD problem identifies the locations of APs to 
create a WMN that is the most robust to the worst possible jamming attack.  Such an 
attack could represent the actions of a rational human opponent, or the worst-case 
positioning of unintentional interference sources such as civilian radios, other RF 
devices, or high-voltage electrical devices. 
A. THE OPERATOR’S PROBLEM:  CALCULATING THE VALUE OF A 
WMN TOPOLOGY 
We begin by describing the operator’s problem, a method of calculating the value 
of a WMN physical topology given fixed AP and jammer locations.  Building on the 
notation of Nicholas and Alderson (2012), we define N to be the set of all AP nodes, 
indexed by i = 1, 2,…, n, where n N= .  We define M to be the set of all jammer nodes, 
indexed by k = 1, 2,…, m, where m M= .  Let ( )1 2, ,..., nλ λ λ λ= represent the locations 
of the APs, and let ( )1 2, ,..., mχ χ χ χ= represent the locations of the jamming sources.  
We define the operating area as the topographic area where an AP i or jamming source k 
may be physically located.  A two-dimensional coordinate (x, y) is associated with each 
location iλ  and with each kχ ; these coordinates represent the northing and easting for AP 
node i and each jammer node k, respectively.  We assume that APs and jammers, once 
placed, remain stationary.  We divide the operating area into a set of discrete coverage 
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regions R, indexed by r = 1, 2, … |R|.  Although our formulation allows the use of any 
discretization scheme, our implementation assumes rectangular regions arranged in a grid 
(see Figure 1).  Each coverage region r R∈  has an associated elevation that we assume is 
uniform throughout the region.  This assumption is not true in practice, but is consistent 














Figure 1.  A representative discretized operating area and wireless mesh network without 
a jammer (left) and with a jammer (right).  White circles denote the location of access 
points, shaded regions denote the areas with sufficient client coverage (i.e., zero coverage 
shortfall), and dashed lines denote links in the backhaul network.  The placement of a 
jammer, denoted by a black circle, decreases client coverage and disrupts backhaul 
network connectivity. 
 
Figure 1 (left) depicts a typical WMN in the absence of jamming.  AP nodes are 
illustrated as white circles, and shaded grid elements represent locations that receive 
sufficient client coverage from the APs.  The coverage obtained at each grid location 
depends on several factors including the local terrain, AP and client radio characteristics, 
and EMI.  The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the backhaul network used to 
communicate between AP nodes. 
Figure 1 (right) depicts a WMN in the presence of jamming.  Each jammer node 
k M∈ (illustrated as a black circle) may have two active transmitters:  one interfering 
with nearby AP client coverage radios and the other interfering with nearby AP backhaul 
network radios.  Without loss of generality, we assume APs are not subject to  
 9 
self-jamming or interference from other APs, and jammers emit signals consisting of 
random noise perfectly matched in frequency, phase, and polarization to AP 
transmissions (i.e., perfect physical-layer interference) (Pelechrinis et al., 2011). 
Each AP node i N∈ may serve as a source of network traffic.  We identify sink or 
destination nodes d N∈  as the sinks for all network traffic.  As presented by  
Shankar (2008), in the case where the number of destinations is less than the number of 
jammers, the optimal jamming solution is to simply jam each destination, cutting off all 
delivered network flow.  To avoid such results, here we assume all APs serve as 
destination nodes, as is common in peer-to-peer networks (Schollmeier, 2001). 
We assume the physical location of one destination node, designated the 
headquarters (HQ) node, is known in advance and fixed.  This node may serve as the 
network gateway and/or location of domain controllers and servers.  This is consistent 
with reality, where network designers must place an AP at their headquarters, satellite 
gateway, or Internet point of presence (PoP).  While there is no hard constraint requiring 
the HQ node to connect to other APs, in realistic problems we find it is always connected.  
The placement of this node within the operating area greatly influences the resulting 
topologies. 
Building on the SRRA+C formulation of Nicholas and Alderson (2012), we 
quantify the value of a particular WMN topology in the presence of EMI by calculating 
two subproblems.  First, we calculate the value of coverage provided to client devices 
Zcoverage, and then calculate the value of delivered backhaul network flow Zflow.  We use a 
linear combination to obtain a value of the given WMN topology: 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , (1)coverage flowZ Z w Z     λ χ λ χ λ χ≡ −
where w is a positive scalar representing the relative importance of network flow (see 
Appendix for complete derivation), and the ^ symbol denotes that the locations λ  and χ  
are fixed. 
Given fixed AP locations λˆ  and fixed jammer locations χˆ , the operator D aims 
to minimize client coverage shortfall and minimize negative network flow (i.e., maximize 
positive network flow) by choice of flow variables S, F, T, and P.  For clarity, we 
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explicitly state the variables being minimized by the operator D in the operator’s 
problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, min , , , , , , . (2)coverage flowS F T PZ Z wZ S F T Pλ χ λ χ λ χ= −D                
 
B. THE ATTACKER’S PROBLEM:  PLACING JAMMERS 
The attacker A, given fixed AP node locations λˆ , wishes to maximize disruption 
to the WMN by placing jammer nodes at locations χ: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , max min , , , , , , . (3)coverage flowS F T PZ Z wZ S F T Pχλ λ λ χ λ χ⋅ ⋅ = −AD          DAD :         
 
The attacker’s objective is to maximize coverage shortfall and minimize delivered 
backhaul network flow. 
C. THE DESIGNER’S PROBLEM:  PLACING ACCESS POINTS 
The network designer D, given fixed jammer node locations χˆ , wishes to 
maximize WMN performance by placing AP nodes at locations λ: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆmin min , , , , , , . (4)coverage flowS F T PZ Z wZ S F T Pλχ λ χ λ χ= −DD               
The designer’s objective is to minimize coverage shortfall and maximize delivered 
backhaul network flow.  The SRRA+C problem presented in Nicholas and Alderson 
(2012) is a special case of the designer’s problem with no jammer nodes. 
D. THE DAD PROBLEM 
By nesting the problems of the operator, attacker, and designer, we obtain the 
overall SRRA+C DAD formulation: 
( ) ( )( )
, , ,
min max min , , , , , , . (5)flowS F T PZ Z wZ S F T Pλ χ λ χ λ χ= −DAD                    coverage
 
The designer D first chooses AP locations λ, which the attacker A then aims to maximally 
disrupt by placing jammers at locations χ.  The operator D calculates client coverage and 
determines how to route traffic given AP and jammer locations.  By allowing the 
designer to move first in this sequential Stackelberg game, we assume the designer is 
operating in an area that will subsequently be subject to jamming.  Had we allowed the 
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attacker to move first (i.e., ADD), we would assume the designer is being forced to 
operate in an area already being jammed. 
The solution to the DAD problem indicates where the network designer should 
place APs to minimize the worst-case disruption possible by EMI.  That is, when solved 
to optimality, the obtained AP network topology is completely immune to greater 
degradation, as the attacker cannot possibly do more damage.  Note that the converse is 
not true.  Because we assume the designer (with perfect information of the worst possible 
attack) places his APs first, it is possible (indeed, likely) that the designer could improve 
upon this design given fixed jammers.  Likewise, if we allow the attacker to move first 
(ADD), it is likely he could improve upon his attack given fixed APs.  In other words, we 
find a Stackelberg equilibrium, but not a Nash equilibrium (Cruz, 1975; Fudenberg & 
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III. SOLUTION METHOD 
A. SOLVING THE OPERATOR’S PROBLEM 
We solve the operator’s problems by calculating the two components of the 
overall objective function ZD (2) separately.  Calculating client coverage Zcoverage is a 
straightforward series of calculations based on input data.  Calculating the value of 
network flow Zflow via the SRRA problem is more challenging.  Xiao et al. (2004) 
observe that the SRRA problem has special structure that allows it to be solved using 
dual decomposition.  We use the same approach to solve the problem using the 
subgradient method (Bertsekas, 1999), stopping after a given number of iterations.  See 
Nicholas and Alderson (2012) and Nicholas (2009) for further details on our SRRA 
solution technique. 
B. SOLVING THE ATTACKER AND THE DESIGNER’S PROBLEMS 
The attacker and designer’s problems (like the SRRA+C problem) are 
nondifferentiable, nonconvex, nonlinear optimization problems.  The difficulty of finding 
exact solutions to such problems increases the desirability of using heuristic 
computational techniques, such as genetic or simulated annealing algorithms, and 
sampling algorithms, such as mesh adaptive direct search (MADS) (Audet, 2004).  In our 
previous work, we use the DIviding RECTangles (DIRECT) algorithm of Jones et al. 
(1993) to sample the SRRA+C solution space (i.e., the designer’s problem with no 
jammers) to quickly find solutions.  This same approach will work for the attacker’s 
problem ZAD (given fixed AP nodes), and for the designer’s problem ZDD (given  
fixed jammers). 
DIRECT is a sampling optimization algorithm based on Lipschitzian optimization 
(Horst & Hoang, 1996, pp. 43-46).  The algorithm iteratively samples from the solution 
space, where the number of dimensions is 2m  (attacker’s problem) or ( )2 1n −  
(designer’s problem), the length of each dimension is proportional to the operating area 
length or width, and a single point in the solution space represents the locations of all the 
nodes being placed (whether AP locations λ in the designer’s problem, or jammer 
locations χ in the attacker’s problem).  The algorithm progressively samples from and 
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divides the space into smaller hyper-rectangles.  At each step, it chooses to explore a 
particular sub-hyper-rectangle based on both the solution value of the center point and the 
total volume of the given shape, where larger volumes are more desirable because they 
indicate greater unexplored territory and hence greater potential for an improved 
incumbent solution.  The DIRECT algorithm is continuous, i.e., it can place APs or 
jammers at any location within the user-specified operating area.  The DIRECT algorithm 
is guaranteed to eventually converge to the optimum solution, as it will eventually sample 
within an arbitrary distance of any point in the solution space (Jones et al., 1993). 
We observe DIRECT suffers problems symptomatic of the curse of 
dimensionality (Bellman, 1961).  First, as the number of nodes (and thus dimensions) 
increases, the portion of a dimension needed to capture a given fraction of the solution 
space increases logarithmically.  That is, at higher dimensions (i.e., when placing more 
APs or jammers), DIRECT requires an increasing number of iterations in order to 
sufficiently search the solution space.  Also, at higher dimensions, an increasing 
percentage of solutions are near the solution space boundary (i.e., the physical boundary 
of the operating area).  This makes sampling for good AP and jammer locations near the 
operating area boundaries increasingly difficult (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2001, 
pp. 22-24).  We find that the DIRECT algorithm running on a laptop computer quickly 
finds good solutions to the attacker and designer’s problems for networks consisting of 
up to 10 APs where the operating area is discretized into r = 6,000 regions.  Future 
research could consider avoiding the problem of sampling near the operating area 
boundary via parallelization of the algorithm:  dividing the original solution space into 
subspaces, exploring each, and then comparing the best solutions found. 
C. SOLVING THE DAD PROBLEM 
To solve the SRRA+C DAD problem, we cannot simply use one large instance of 
DIRECT to search concurrently for good AP locations λ and jammer locations χ, as the 
attacker and designer are playing against each other and have opposing  
(i.e., maximization and minimization) goals.  Instead, we follow Alderson et al. (2011) 
and decompose the DAD problem into a designer D master problem with separate 
attacker A subproblems.  We solve using different instances of DIRECT, each with its 
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own objective function.  In the master problem, DIRECT chooses AP locations uλ  for 
each iteration u = 1,2,…, max_master_iterations.  For those given AP locations, another 
instance of DIRECT is initialized to solve the associated subproblem, choosing jammer 
locations vχ  for each iteration v = 1,2,…, max_sub_iterations.  Given AP locations uλ  
and jammer locations vχ , the overall objective value is then obtained via solving the 
operator’s problem (2).  After max_sub_iterations, the subproblem returns the jammer 
locations ^χ  yielding the best attack found (i.e., the highest overall objective value).  
The master problem continues searching for the best AP locations *λ  to minimize the 
damage caused by the worst attack found until max_master_iterations.  The following 
pseudo-code details our nested DIRECT algorithm: 
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Algorithm DIRECT for SRRA+C DAD 
Input:  Full SRRA problem data (number and operating characteristics of APs and 
jammers, HQ node location, and elevation and coverage requirements for each ) 
and desired number of iterations max_master_iterations and max_sub_iterations. 
 
Output:  Best estimate of optimal AP locations ( )* * * *1 2, ,..., nλ λ λ λ=  and 
( )* * * *1 2, ,..., mχ χ χ χ= , and operator solution ( )* *,Z λ χD . 
 
begin 
Store map data 
Initialize u ← 1 
Master problem (Designer) 
while (u < max_master_iterations) do 
Calculate AP locations uλ using DIRECT  
Initialize v ← 1 
Subproblem (Attacker) 
while (v < max_sub_iterations) do 
Calculate EMI locations vχ  using DIRECT 
 Solve operator’s problem ZD  for uλ and vχ  
if  ( ) ( )^, ,u v uZ Zλ χ λ χ>D D  /* If this is the best attack yet, store as 
incumbent */ 
  ^ kχ χ←  
  ( ) ( )^, ,u u vZ Zλ χ λ χ←D D  
 endif; 
 v ← v + 1 
end; 
if ( ) ( )^ * *, ,uZ Zλ χ λ χ<D D  /* If this is the best design yet, store as 
incumbent */ 
 * uλ λ←  
 * ^χ χ←   
 ( ) ( )* * ^, ,uZ Zλ χ λ χ←D D  
endif; 
u ← u + 1 
end; 
Return best AP locations *λ , EMI locations *χ , and operator’s solution 





For given AP locations uλ  and given enough iterations, DIRECT will eventually 
find a solution within an arbitrary distance of the solution space point defining the 
optimal jamming attack.  In practice, we are constrained by the computational limits of 
our computer implementation (specifically, double-precision, floating-point arithmetic), 
and cannot divide any hyper-rectangle more than 32 or 33 times. 
Our algorithm to solve the attacker and designer’s problems using DIRECT runs 
in polynomial time, is specifically: 
( )( )( )2 2 3 2 2 3O u R n un u v R n vn v+ + + +  
time, where u and v are, respectively, the current number of DIRECT algorithm iterations 
for the master and subproblems, R is the total number of coverage regions, and n is the 
number of APs, assuming n < m, the number of jammers.  Though the algorithm runs in 
polynomial time, the problem grows very quickly in the number of nodes being placed 
and the number of DIRECT iterations. 
In Nicholas (2009) and Nicholas and Alderson (2012), we calculate a theoretical 
lower bound for the SRRA+C problem based on the best possible AP topology that 
provides zero coverage shortfall and maximum possible delivered network flow.  (Such 
results are achievable only in unrealistic circumstances, where APs provide complete 
client coverage to the operating area, yet are located directly next to one another to 
provide maximum backhaul flow.)  The optimality gap for any SRRA+C solution is the 
difference between the obtained objective value ( )Z λDD (4) and this theoretical lower 
bound.  In the SRRA+C DAD problem, a theoretical upper bound can be calculated as 
the difference between the worst possible jamming attack (i.e., complete client coverage 
shortfall and zero network flow) and the obtained objective value ZDAD  (5).  Such attacks 
are possible with powerful and plentiful jammers.  However, as we use a log utility 
function to quantify the value of network flow, a total flow of zero would obtain a 
penalty of negative infinity, so this theoretical upper bound is of limited practical use.  
Though we have no feasible method of precisely calculating the optimality gap of any 
particular solution, we do not have the need, considering our intended user is conducting 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Building on the software we initially developed for Nicholas (2009), we 
implement our algorithm for solving the SRRA+C DAD problem using Microsoft Visual 
C++.  Our decision support tool runs on a laptop, does not require commercial solvers or 
other add-ins, and can use terrain information freely downloaded from the Internet. 
Many different factors affect the shape of the SRRA+C solution space, including 
the technical characteristics of the APs and jammers, their relative numbers and signal 
strengths, the type and effectiveness of jamming, the amount of overlap in client 
coverage, the effects of terrain on electromagnetic propagation, and the assignment of 
traffic destination nodes.  An exhaustive exploration of all these factors is beyond the 
scope of this report.  We focus on those factors that have the greatest effect on model 
outcome.  In the following analyses, and unless otherwise noted, we follow Wood et al. 
(2007) and assume each radio in each AP and the associated radio in each jammer are 
identical, transmitting with the same output power and similar antennae.  The scalar w is 
set to one, thereby weighting client coverage and backhaul network flow equally.  In 
previous field testing, we have found this value to yield realistic network topologies 
(Nicholas & Alderson, 2012).  We begin with simple analyses on flat “tabletop” terrain to 
gain intuition on optimal jamming and defense strategies, and then consider realistic case 
studies using actual terrain data.  We also provide analysis of the performance of  
our method. 
We consider two types of jamming.  In narrowband noise jamming, spot 
jamming, or simply single-channel jamming, a jammer places all its energy on a single 
channel (Mpitziopoulous et al., 2009; Poisel, 2011).  We assume each AP is assigned its 
own channel, so single-channel jamming will only affect the AP using that channel (and 
its associated client devices) at that time.  This may be a preferred jamming strategy 
when maximum energy must be directed at a single AP in order to overpower the signal 
of the AP, or when energy must be conserved by the jammer.  Good attack strategies 
using single-channel jamming in our model are quite trivial:  place the jammer as close as 
possible to, or on top of, an AP on the same channel.  This is because jamming affects 
only the receiver of a radio, not the transmitter.  While our SRRA+C formulation 
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considers client devices, the optimal targets are APs because they require two-way 
connections with both other APs and their connected client devices, and so are single 
points of failure for both backhaul network traffic and client coverage.  An attacker 
should assign additional jammers to other APs until the network is sufficiently degraded.  
The defensive strategy under single-channel jamming reduces to determining where to 
place redundant APs to build maximum robustness.  This, in turn, is determined by the 
relative values of network flow and client coverage (the two competing terms in our 
objective function). 
We also consider broadband noise jamming or barrage jamming, where the EMI 
produced by a jammer is spread across the entire targeted spectrum (Mpitziopoulous  
et al., 2009; Poisel, 2011, p. 470).  Barrage jamming affects all APs and client devices 
operating in that spectrum; we assume the effects of multiple jammers are perfectly 
additive at the respective receivers.  Such jammers provide lower power spectral densities 
(i.e., power per EM wave) than an equivalent single-channel jammer because 
transmission power is spread over a larger frequency range (Poisel, 2011).  They are very 
cheaply acquired or built (Ståhlberg, 2000) and are, hence, increasingly prevalent.  
Additionally, such barrage jamming cannot be overcome by simply placing an additional, 
redundant AP (as in single-channel jamming), as all APs are subject to the same 
interference.  Shankar (2008) uses the SRRA formulation and attacks a network using 
barrage jammers.  His optimal attack strategy is the same as ours for single-channel 
jamming:  place the jammer as close as possible to, or on top of, an AP.  However, 
Shankar does not consider client coverage.  As we will demonstrate, the optimal attack 
strategy in our SRRA+C model using barrage jamming is often to attack more than one 
AP (and its associated client devices) concurrently, while the optimal defensive strategy 
involves finding AP locations that minimize the ability of jammers to conduct  
concurrent attacks. 
A. EXPLORING THE ATTACKER’S PROBLEM 
1. Attacking a Network of Two APs 
We first explore the attacker’s problem (3) by finding the optimal single jammer 
attack against a network of two fixed APs.  Consider a one square kilometer operating 
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area (gridded into 100 x 100 regions) with flat terrain, with an AP placed near the top and 
bottom of the region (left side of Figure 2).  With no jammer present, these two APs 
(depicted as open circles) will provide the client coverage shown in white and deliver 
network traffic to each other at a maximum rate of 419 kilobits per second (kbps).  Our 
formulation penalizes solutions based on the degree of insufficient client coverage, 
depicted in Figure 2 as darker areas. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Client coverage provided by two APs (indicated by black circles) on flat 
terrain without jammers (a), during optimal single-channel jamming attack (b), and 
barrage jamming attack (c).  White areas indicate sufficient client coverage where 
client devices are able to connect to APs.  Darker areas indicate progressively 
worse client coverage shortfall. 
In a single-channel jamming attack, the optimal attack is to simply place the 
single jammer directly on top of either AP, depicted as an “X” on the bottom AP in 
Figure 2(b).  This direct-AP attack eliminates the client coverage by the bottom AP, and 
reduces network traffic flow between the APs to essentially zero.  In barrage jamming, 
the optimal attack is to place the jammer in between the two APs in a between-AP attack 
(Figure 2(c)).  In such a location, the barrage jammer is able to significantly reduce the 
client coverage provided by both APs, and reduce the delivered network traffic flow to 
both devices to essentially zero. 
The between-AP attack may at first seem counterintuitive, as the horizontal 
centerline of the scenario without jammers (Figure 2(a)) receives less coverage than that 
area immediately surrounding each AP at the bottom and top; it may seem this center 
area has “less to lose” than an attack directly on each AP.  However, recall that our 
formulation penalizes the degree of coverage shortfall.  By placing the jammer in 
between each AP, the jammer maximizes this penalty by making the centerline region 
(a) (b) (c) 
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receive worse client coverage than would be provided if the jammer was placed directly 
on top of either AP.  Likewise, network flow is maximally disrupted in a barrage 
jamming attack by placing the jammer between each AP because this reduces delivered 
flow to both APs, as our model assumes user datagram protocol (UDP)-like traffic 
transmission without handshake dialogues (Postel, 1980).  Figures 3(a) and (b) are 
contour plots, respectively, depicting the client coverage value and network flow value 
provided by two APs in the presence of a single barrage jammer placed at each of 104 
locations enumerated in the Cartesian plane.  The plots show that the worst (i.e., higher) 
objective values are obtained when the barrage jammer is used in a between-AP attack. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Contour plot of client coverage values (a) and network flow values (b) 
provided by two fixed APs (open circles) in the presence of one barrage jammer.  
The shade at each (x,y) location indicates the client coverage or network flow 
value when a jammer is placed at that location (worse jamming attacks are 
indicated by darker areas). 
 
Note that in this simple example, the two unjammed APs provide overlapping 
client coverage (i.e., the overlap in white coverage areas in Figure 2).  This is a function 
of AP placement and radio characteristics.  When trying to maximize client coverage 
(even at the expense of network flow), such overlap may be wasteful, but does accurately 
reflect real-world AP placement that attempts to provide uninterrupted coverage to 
mobile clients.  We find that modifying radio characteristics to change the size of this 
overlap alone generally doesn’t affect the optimal barrage jamming strategy.  The best 
attack may still be the between-AP attack because coverage isn’t binary (adequate or not 
(a) (b) 
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adequate):  we penalize the degree of insufficiency.  If there is little or no coverage 
between two APs, the optimal attack location may still be between APs because a 
jamming attack makes inadequate coverage that much worse.  However, if the area in 
between the two APs is already at the maximum penalty limit, then a jammer will not be 
able to penalize it.  In this case, a direct-AP attack may be more effective. 
We next examine the optimal jamming strategy as a function of relative AP and 
jammer transmission powers.  Figure 4(a) shows the optimal y location(s) for one barrage 
jammer placed between two APs at locations (50, 20) and (50, 80) to minimize client 
coverage, as a function of jammer transmission power relative to client device power.  
Figure 4(b) presents the same analysis for a barrage jammer to minimize backhaul 
network flow.  Equivalent solutions in each figure are shown by two points at a given 
power ratio.  We observe that when jamming power relative to AP and client 
transmission power is low enough, the optimal barrage jamming strategy may become the 
direct-AP attack. 
 
Figure 4.  Optimal y location for a single barrage jammer to minimize client 
coverage (a) and network flow (b) provided by two APs placed at y = 20 and  
y = 80, as a function of jammer transmission power relative to AP transmission 
power.  The solid line indicates client coverage shortfall (a) or delivered network 
flow (b).  Two points at a given power ratio indicate solutions with the same 
objective value. 
 
Note the sudden jump in Figure 4(a).  This is an artifact of continuous client 
service—which, on perfectly flat terrain, is essentially a circle around each AP—being 
discretized into the gridded operating area.  As the relative transmission power of an AP 
changes, the “circle” of client coverage around each AP will change in a discontinuous 
(a) (b) 
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fashion, occasionally jumping in value.  In this case, it occurs when the area receiving 
adequate client service no longer overlaps the upper and lower boundaries of the 
operating area.  The calculation of network flow (i.e., Figure 4(b)) is not affected by the 
discretization of the operating area, so these jumps are not present.  
We observe that the optimal jamming strategy (i.e., direct-AP or between-AP 
attack) for attacking client coverage and network flow occurs at different power ratio 
levels.  That is, the best location to place a jammer to maximize client coverage shortfall 
may not always be the best place to minimize network flow.  The best overall location 
will be a function of w, the positive scalar indicating the value of network flow in the 
SRRA+C objective function (6). 
2. One Jammer, Four APs 
We next consider the optimal barrage jamming attack in the presence of four APs.  
Figures 5(a) and (b) are contour plots, respectively depicting the client coverage value 
and network flow value provided by four APs in the presence of a single barrage jammer 
placed at each of 104 Cartesian locations.  As in the two AP example, the optimal attack 
against client coverage remains between the four APs in a smooth, continuous pattern.  
The pattern of optimal network flow attack strategies is more complex, however.  The 
most damaging attacks occur not when the jammer is placed directly in the middle, but 
around the middle in a small ring.  This complex pattern emerges for two reasons.  First, 
as noted above, we assume all nodes are destinations for network traffic and hence form a 
peer-to-peer network.  Whereas client coverage grid squares connect only to that single 
AP providing the best service, APs can exchange traffic simultaneously with multiple 
APs.  In this example, each of the APs is able to connect with the other three APs.  
Placing a single jammer at various locations among the four APs degrades network 
communication between each of these AP-to-AP connections in a nonlinear, but 
symmetric fashion.  Second, nonlinearity also results from running the subgradient 
method on the SRRA problem only for a fixed number of iterations (as opposed to 
solving to optimality).  We find these slight numerical irregularities to be worth the 
benefit of greatly reduced computation time. 
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This simple example illustrates how quickly this problem grows in complexity.  
The number and respective locations of each AP and jammer have a significant impact on 
the optimal offensive and defensive design strategies.  The effects of terrain and different 
radio characteristics only magnify this complexity, making a quick method of finding 
relatively good solutions valuable to a network designer. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Contour plot of client coverage values (a) and network flow values (b) 
provided by four fixed APs (open circles) in the presence of one barrage jammer 
on flat terrain.  The shade at each (x,y) location indicates the overall client 
coverage value (a) or network flow value (b) when a jammer is placed at that 
location (worse jamming attacks are indicated by darker areas). 
3. Two Jammers, Four APs 
We next place two jammers among four fixed APs.  This is a four-dimensional 
problem (since each jammer has a corresponding x and y location) and difficult to present 
in two dimensions.  We find that the most effective jamming strategy in this particular 
scenario is a “symmetric” jamming attack, where, for each jamming attack, the location 
of the second jammer is across the positive diagonal axis from the first jammer.  That is, 
if the first jammer is located at point (x,y), the second jammer is located at point (y,x).  
For the sake of clarity, we present the objective values of only these symmetric attacks 
for client coverage and network flow, respectively depicted in Figures 6(a) and (b).  In 
each, the color at each point represents the value of client coverage or network flow 
(respectively), when one jammer is placed at that point and the other jammer is placed 
immediately across the positive diagonal axis.  The best location for the jammers is the 
(a) (b) 
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area immediately in front of two diagonally-positioned APs.  Clearly, these results are 
greatly affected by the relative locations of each radio device. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Contour plot of client coverage values (a) and network flow values (b) 
provided by four fixed APs (open circles) in the presence of two barrage jammers 
on flat terrain.  The color at each (x,y) location indicates the overall client coverage 
value (a) or network flow value (b) when one jammer is placed at that location and 
the other jammer is placed immediately across the positive diagonal axis.  Worse 
jamming attacks are indicated by darker areas. 
B. EXPLORING THE DESIGNER’S PROBLEM 
We briefly explore the designer’s problem (4) of finding optimal locations for 
APs with jammers at fixed locations.  While attempting to minimize the effects of 
jamming, the designer must consider the competing objectives of client coverage and 
network flow:  network flow can be maximized by simply placing the APs as far as 
possible from the jammers (i.e., on the farthest border of the operating area), but such 
placement will likely provide very little client coverage.  The optimal solution to the 
designer’s problem balances these competing concerns. 
We consider a scenario with one fixed jammer located in the center of the  
100 x 100 operating area.  The designer places two APs to minimize the damage incurred 
by the jammer.  This problem is too large to enumerate within a reasonable amount of 
time (roughly 35 days with our computer), so we sample 10,000 random solutions; 
Figures 7 and 8 show the 25 best solutions, using a single-channel and barrage jammer, 
respectively.  Individual solutions (consisting of a pair of AP locations) are depicted as 
(a) (b) 
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dots connected by a line.  With a single-channel jammer (Figure 7), the best strategy in 
this scenario is to place the jammed AP far from the jammer and place the unjammed AP 
near the jammer, maximizing the utility of providing client coverage in the unjammed 
area.  With a barrage jammer (Figure 8), the best strategy is to move the APs away from 
the jammer to a point that maximizes client coverage while balancing the competing 
requirement of network flow.  In this scenario, these locations are in the corners of the 
operating area. 
 
Figure 7.  The 25 best of 10,000 randomly-sampled solutions for placing two APs 
in an operating area, with one single-client jammer in the center.  Each solution is 
depicted by a line and two dots denoting the location of the APs. 
 
 
Figure 8.  The 25 best of 10,000 randomly-sampled solutions for placing two APs 
in an operating area, with one barrage in the center.  Each solution is depicted by a 
line and two dots denoting the location of the APs. 
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C. EXPLORING THE DAD PROBLEM 
We now consider the full DAD problem, where the network designer determines 
the optimal strategy for minimizing the damage caused by the optimal jamming attack.  
Many variables affect the optimal solution to the operator’s, attacker’s, and designer’s 
problems; an exhaustive analysis of these variables is beyond the scope of this report.  
We focus on interesting examples that are likely to occur in realistic conditions.  We 
model our AP and jammer radio characteristics on the Cisco Aironet 1550 WMN AP, and 
our client devices on a generic internal 802.11n wireless interface card.  We examine 
increasingly complex examples, gradually adding devices and eventually considering the 
effects of terrain.  The results are presented in a tri-panel format, where the left panel 
depicts the best unjammed solution found (i.e., the designer’s problem without jammers); 
the middle panel depicts the best undefended solution found when the attacker now jams 
the unjammed solution (i.e., the solution to the attacker’s problem (3)); and the right 
panel depicts the best defended solution found when the designer chooses that network 
topology which minimizes the effects of the best jamming attack found (i.e., the DAD 
solution (5)).  (Note that these panels represent the net results of our nested DIRECT 
optimization, which samples many different jamming attacks for many different network 
designs.)  For each solution panel, the thickness of the lines between APs is directly 
proportional to delivered network flow.  We run DIRECT until the solution objective 
values have not changed significantly for more than 10 function evaluations, or 20 master 
and subproblem iterations of DIRECT (whichever occurs first). 
We first consider a network of four APs being attacked by one barrage jammer 
(see Figure 9), with the fixed HQ node located in the lower left of the operating area.  In 
Figure 9(a), the designer places his four APs to cover most of the operating area.  Given 
this fixed design, in Figure 9(b), the attacker places his barrage jammer in the middle of 
the operating area, greatly increasing client coverage shortfall and decreasing total 
delivered network flow.  Finally, in Figure 9(c), the designer chooses a more dispersed 
network topology that minimizes the damage of the worst attack, generating reduced 
client coverage shortfall.  In this case, the DAD solution does not provide more network 
flow than the undefended attacker’s solution.  (However, our tool stores alternate,  
runner-up solutions that often provide both increased client coverage and network flow.) 
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Figure 9.  SRRA+C, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of four APs and 
one barrage jammer on flat terrain. 
In Figure 10, we add a second other jammer.  The attacker now places each near 
an AP, rather than directly between the APs.  In the DAD solution, the designer again 
chooses an AP topology that minimizes the effectiveness of a between-AP attack, but of 
course cannot overcome a direct-AP attack from a barrage jammer.  Note that because the 
jammers have the same operating characteristics as the APs, the only way to completely 
eliminate client coverage is to place a jammer directly on top of an AP.  In the DAD 
solution, this occurs in the upper-left, but the algorithm chooses a between-AP attack in 
the lower-right.  The DAD solution decreases coverage shortfall and increases network 
flow over the undefended solution. 
 
Figure 10.  SRRA+C, designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of four 
APs and two barrage jammers on flat terrain. 
We next consider five APs in the presence of two barrage jammers in Figure 11, 
and five APs with three barrage jammers in Figure 12.  With two jammers, the attacker 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
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favors between-AP attacks, but with three jammers, he favors the direct-AP attack.  As 
detailed earlier, there is a tension when placing barrage jammers: as a jammer gets nearer 
an AP, it more effectively jams that AP, but less effectively jams distant APs.  As the 
ratio of jammers to APs increases, the direct-AP attack becomes more attractive because 
this tension slackens: distant APs are more likely to already be effectively jammed. 
 
Figure 11.  SRRA+C, designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of five 
APs and two barrage jammers on flat terrain. 
 
 
Figure 12.  SRRA+C, designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of five 
APs and three barrage jammers on flat terrain. 
In Figure 13, we consider six APs in the presence of two barrage jammers.  
Rather than distributing the first five APs in the pattern depicted in Figures 11 and 12, the 
DIRECT algorithm finds a better overall solution can be obtained by placing APs in each 
corner, and placing the sixth AP in the lower right corner, directly next to another AP.  
This allows the algorithm to concurrently provide very good client coverage and 
delivered backhaul network flow, and may be reasonable in situations with many client 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
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devices at that location.  In the DAD solution, the designer chooses to avoid a potentially 
damaging double direct-AP attack by moving the sixth AP away from the corner.  In 
Figure 14, we observe the same behavior in a network with six APs and three jammers. 
 
Figure 13.  SRRA+C, designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of six 
APs and two barrage jammers on flat terrain. 
 
 
Figure 14.  SRRA+C, designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of six 
APs and three barrage jammers on flat terrain. 
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Using our tool, we compare the performance of our algorithm to exhaustive 
enumeration.  Our algorithm places n-1 APs (i.e., the HQ node is assumed fixed in place) 
and m jammers in a continuous space.  We can discretize this space by limiting feasible 
AP and jammer locations to a finite set.  Using the same discretization scheme as that 
used to define the set of coverage regions R within the operating region, the number of 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
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 solutions to this discretized variant of the 
SRRA+C DAD problem.  The exponential increase in the number of solutions as n, m, 
and R  grow restricts the use of this enumeration method to trivially small problems, but 
we provide a few examples to demonstrate the performance of the DIRECT algorithm. 
It is not valid to compare the DAD solutions found using DIRECT and exhaustive 
enumeration by simply determining which produces a lower overall objective value.  If 
our goal was simply to find the lowest overall value, we could set DIRECT to run with 
very few subproblem iterations.  This would prevent DIRECT from finding good 
jamming attacks and yield a low overall objective value; however, our goal is to find 
those WMN designs that are most robust to jamming attacks.  To demonstrate the 
performance of DIRECT in finding such designs, we use DIRECT to attack the best  
(i.e., most interference-robust) AP design found using enumeration.  We then use 
enumeration to attack the best AP design found using DIRECT. 
Consider a small, flat, operating region discretized into 10 10 100× =  coverage 
regions.  Using the described discretization scheme, we first enumerate all possible 
discrete solutions for WMNs consisting of two APs and one jammer, three APs and one 
jammer, and two APs and two jammers.  We then use DIRECT to attack the fixed AP 
topology of the best DAD solution found using enumeration, and present the results in 
Table 1.  Bold values indicate that the DIRECT method obtains a worse jamming attack 
than enumeration.  DIRECT does this in each case, and does so in less than a second of 
processing time. 
  DAD Solved Using Enumeration DIRECT Attack 











2 1 4,950 642.73 0:00:49 123 703.78 0:00:0.7 
3 1 495,000 472.317 1:40:56 101 502.74 0:00:1 
2 2 495,000 5268.58 0:41:37 167 6087.93 0:00:1 
3 2 24,502,500 933.43 53:54:27 103 1019.68 0:00:1 
Table 1.  DIRECT barrage jamming attacks on designs obtained using discrete 
enumeration.  In each case, DIRECT is able to find an attack that provides greater 
damage than that found using enumeration. 
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In Table 2, we do the opposite:  we use DIRECT to find DAD solutions and then 
use enumeration to attack the fixed AP topology of the best one.  Bold values indicate 
that the DIRECT method found worse jamming attacks than the enumeration method.  In 
no case does the enumeration method yield an attack more damaging than that found 
using DIRECT.  While these results demonstrate instances where DIRECT is more 
effective and efficient than discrete enumeration in quickly finding interference-robust 
WMN topologies, this is not a fair comparison.  DIRECT is a continuous algorithm, able 
to place APs and jammers anywhere within the operating region, whereas discrete 
enumeration is limited to placing these nodes at fixed, finite locations.  Hence, DIRECT 
is guaranteed to eventually find a solution at least as good as discrete enumeration.  
Future research could compare the use of DIRECT to other algorithms, such as genetic or 
simulated annealing algorithms (see, e.g., Serafino, Liuzzi, Piccialli, Riccio, and  
Toraldo, 2011). 
  DAD Solved Using DIRECT Enumerated Attack 











2 1 11,249 703.52 0:00:41 100 701.52 0:00:1.0 
3 1 5,591 561.98 0:00:50 100 539.94 0:00:1.0 
2 2 6,447 3909.00 0:00:27 4,950 2003.40 0:00:27 
3 2 33,963 1387.69 0:09:22 4,950 945.59 0:01:2.0 
Table 2.  Enumerated barrage jamming attacks on designs obtained using 
DIRECT.  In no case is the enumeration method able to find an attack that 
provides greater damage than that found using DIRECT. 
We next analyze the performance of our algorithm using the 50-node network 
considered by Xiao et al. (2004) and Shankar (2008) on the same 10 10 100× =  flat 
coverage region.  We denote five nodes as destinations for traffic (indicated by large 
black circles in Figure 15), but unlike these authors, we allow any node to serve as a 
source for network traffic.  (This follows from our assumption that each AP will be 
servicing client devices in the surrounding area.)  Shankar uses enumeration to calculate 
the damage incurred by iteratively placing jammers at locations defined by a fixed grid.  
Using our SRRA+C formulation with one and two jammers, we compare attacks 
generated using Shankar’s enumeration method to those generated using our DIRECT 
method.  The results are presented in Table 3.  In both cases, DIRECT is able to find a 
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more damaging attack than the enumeration method, and does so in considerably  
less time. 
 
Figure 15.  SRRA+C analysis of the 50-node network considered by Xiao et al. 
(2004) without jammers.  The large black nodes denote traffic destinations.  Client 
coverage shortfall is indicated by shaded areas.  Line thickness is proportional to 
the traffic flow along each respective link. 
 Enumerated Attack DIRECT Attack 











1 100 376.16 0:51:55 7 421.96 0:03:36 
2 4,950 871.15 55:02:7 25 963.45 0:25:45 
Table 3.  Comparison of enumerated and DIRECT attacks using one and two 
jammers against the 50-node network considered by Xiao et al. (2004) and 
Shankar (2008).  In each case, DIRECT is able to find a more damaging attack in 
considerably less time. 
E. THE COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF TERRAIN 
While simple rules-of-thumb such as “Place barrage jammers between APs” may 
be useful when designing WMNs for flat surfaces, the effects of terrain greatly 
complicate the problem.  We conduct a case study using our algorithm to consider the 
effects of terrain.  Our operating area is a 116-acre section on Ft. Ord, California, gridded 
into a 73 73 5,329× =  coverage region.  The area has gently rolling hills, a large parking 
lot, a stadium, and several roads.  We use elevation data from the National Elevation 
Dataset (NED) provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2013) via 
MapMart (2009).  Elevation in the operating area varies from 98 to 226 feet.   
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Figure 16(a) is a contour plot of the elevation, and Figure 16(b) is a Google Maps (2013) 
image of the area. 
 
Figure 16.  Elevation contour map (a) and Google Maps (2013) image (b) of the 
116 acre operating area on Ft. Ord, CA. 
 
Modeling the same Cisco Aironet WMN APs as before, we first consider the 
optimal placement for one barrage jammer among four APs at fixed locations.  Figure 17 
depicts the client coverage provided by four APs arranged in a square about 160 meters 
across.  As in Figure 5, we fix the four APs and place one barrage jammer at each of the 
5,329 regions r.  Figure 17(a) depicts the client coverage and Figure 17(b) depicts 
network flow values when the jammer is placed at each location.  Unlike the results on 
flat terrain, the results here are highly nonlinear and cannot be prescribed using simple 
rules-of-thumb.  Placing a barrage jammer at each of the four fixed APs results in very 
different outcomes.  For example, placing the jammer at the lower-left AP location 
provides only moderate client coverage jamming, but provides the worst backhaul 
jamming among the four AP locations.  Our algorithm and tool can help network 




Figure 17.  Contour plot of client coverage values (a) and network flow values (b) 
provided by four fixed APs (open circles) in the presence of one barrage jammer 
on real terrain.  The color at each (x,y) location indicates the overall client 
coverage value (a) or network flow value (b) when a jammer is placed at that 
location (worse jamming attacks are indicated by darker areas). 
As in the previous section, we now examine the unjammed (i.e., SRRA+C), 
undefended, and defended solution in tri-panel format.  The results of four APs and one 
barrage jammer are depicted in Figure 18.  By placing the barrage jammer between two 
APs in the undefended solution, the attacker does considerable damage to the network.  
In the defended solution, the attacker again chooses a between-AP attack, but the 
designer chooses locations for the APs that reduce the damage done to client coverage.  
With two barrage jammers (Figure 19), the attacker places the first jammer in a position 
near that chosen in the two-jammer scenario, and places the second jammer in a direct-
AP attack.  By varying the value of w (here set to one), our algorithm will find AP 
topologies that both decrease client coverage shortfall and increase delivered network 




Figure 18.  SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of four 
APs and one barrage jammer on Ft. Ord terrain. 
 
Figure 19.  SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of four 
APs and two barrage jammers on Ft. Ord terrain. 
In Figures 20 and 21, we consider networks of five APs and, respectively, two 
and three barrage jammers.  In each undefended solution, the attack chooses  
direct-AP attacks for each jammer.  In the DAD solution, the designer places the APs 
farther apart. 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
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Figure 20.  SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of five 
APs and two barrage jammers on Ft. Ord terrain. 
 
 
Figure 21. SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of five 
APs and three barrage jammers on Ft. Ord terrain. 
 
In Figure 22 (six APs and two jammers), the attacker again chooses direct-AP 
attacks in the undefended solution.  In the DAD solution, the attacker nearly severs the 
top two APs from the rest of the network:  traffic between these two segments is less than 
8 kbps.  As noted, our formulation disincentives complete disconnection because SRRA 
(see Appendix) provides an infinite penalty if a destination node does not receive any 
network flow.  In Figure 23, we consider six APs and three barrage jammers.  In this 
case, the attacker essentially denies the use of the upper-left portion of the operating area.  
This forces the designer to place his APs close together in the lower-right portion of the 
operating area and causing considerable damage to client coverage. 
(a) (b) (c) 
(a) (b) (c) 
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Figure 22.  SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of six 
APs and two barrage jammers on Ft. Ord terrain. 
 
 
Figure 23.  SRRA+C designer, attacker, and DAD solutions for a network of six 
APs and three barrage jammers on Ft. Ord terrain. 
  
(a) (b) (c) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The vast number and complex interactions of factors affecting the performance of 
WMNs require that any model of WMNs must incorporate simplifying assumptions to be 
computationally feasible.  In this work, our model of WMN performance is based on 
arguably the most fundamental factor in wireless communications:  the transmission and 
reception of EM energy over terrain (Molish, 2011).  Using the game theoretic DAD 
framework, and based on our SRRA+C model of WMN performance, we develop a 
method for quickly designing WMNs that are robust to the effects of EMI.  While our 
approach specifically considers avoiding the damage caused by the use of simple noise 
jammers, our approach can be generalized to any form of EMI where network 
degradation is a function of distance from the jamming source. 
Within the context of our model, we find that the optimal attack strategy using 
single-channel jammers is a simple direct-AP attack, placing the jammer directly atop an 
AP operating on the same channel.  The optimal defensive strategy against such an attack 
is to place redundant devices nearby, operating on separate channels.  (In reality, such 
inefficient use of resources is often avoided through the use of spread spectrum or 
frequency-hopping technology, not considered in this work.)  The optimal attack strategy 
using barrage jammers is generally a between-AP attack, placing jammers between APs 
to concurrently degrade the service provided by two or more APs.  Defensive strategies 
include moving APs farther apart to minimize concurrent damage, and finding terrain 
locations negating the impact of between-AP attacks. 
As we have demonstrated, however, the relative number and location of devices, 
their positions, and the effects of terrain greatly complicate WMN design strategy.  Our 
decision-support tool quickly prescribes good WMN topologies, considering radio 
operating characteristics, the relative importance of client coverage and network flow, 
and the effects of radio propagation over terrain.  Our tool provides reasonably good 
approximations of network performance, and does so quickly and without guesswork. 
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A. OTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF SRRA+C 
The DAD SRRA+C formulation may be useful in modeling the interactions of 
other, similar systems where areas (whether physical or logical) need to be serviced by a 
fixed number of interconnected entities and need to be robust to worst-case disruption.  
For instance, the formulation could be applied to a logistics network or facility location 
problem (e.g., Church, Scaparra, and Middleton, 2004), where warehouses (i.e., APs) 
need to distribute goods to customers in known locations (i.e., client coverage areas).  
Overlapping warehouse coverage may be inefficient, increasing the incentive to place 
warehouses far apart, but greater distances between warehouses may incur additional 
transportation costs or time lags.  Road construction, traffic jams, or natural disasters 
(i.e., jammers) could be modeled to create a disruption-robust warehouse topology. 
Another application area may be electrical distribution systems, where substations 
(i.e., APs) need to service client areas.  While some overlap in client coverage may be 
beneficial in minimizing the effects of local outages, too much overlap is financially 
inefficient.  Further, increased distances between substations incur greater transmission 
losses.  Blown transformers, fallen trees, and intentional attacks (i.e., jammers) could be 
modeled to increase the robustness of the electrical network to worst-case attack. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Our model of WMN performance makes many simplifying assumptions.  Future 
research could consider the effects of electromagnetic phase or use a more accurate 
method of calculating channel capacity to increase model fidelity.  The modular nature of 
our formulation allows essentially any WMN model to be substituted, including  
high-fidelity simulators like OPNET (Riverbed Technology, 2013), but increased fidelity 
will incur increased runtimes and possibly less tractability. 
We consider only one type of defense to jamming:  placing APs in jamming-
robust locations.  Future research could consider other defenses, such as the use of 
directional antennae as recommended by Ståhlberg (2000).  Antenna direction could be 
modeled as a continuous decision variable, allowing the use of the DIRECT algorithm.  
Directionality would affect both backhaul network performance and client coverage, 
introducing interesting new tensions to the model. 
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As noted, our approach finds the Stackelberg equilibrium, but not the Nash 
equilibrium.  Glicksberg (1952) proves the existence of a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium in a game with continuous payouts and compact strategy spaces.  Our 
problem satisfies both of these conditions if the operator’s variables S, F, T, and P (see 
Appendix) are bounded.  Future research could consider methods of determining the 
Nash equilibrium of our problem. 
Another area of interest is the use of our formulation in creating much larger 
networks (i.e., 100 or more APs).  Due to the curse of dimensionality and the high rate of 
growth in computing time as a function of the number of objects being placed, we may 
examine the iterative use of DIRECT to design small networks and then combine them 
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APPENDIX:  DERIVATION OF JAMMER-COGNIZANT SRRA+C 
FORMULATION 
We quantify the value of a particular WMN topology in the presence of EMI by 
building on the SRRA+C formulation of Nicholas and Alderson (2012).  We first 
calculate the value of coverage provided to client devices Zcoverage, and then calculate the 
value of delivered backhaul network flow Zflow. 
A. CALCULATING CLIENT COVERAGE 
The client coverage provided by a WMN topology is a function of its AP and 
jammer locations.  Given these locations, we adopt the approach of Nicholas and 
Alderson (2012) and quantify the value of client coverage by first calculating the 
received signal strength (RSS) in Decibel-milliwatts (dBm from each discrete coverage 
region r R∈  from each AP node i or jammer node k (and the reverse path) using the 
standard link budget formula (Olexa, 2005): 
, tx tx tx path misc rx rxRSS power g l l l g l= + − − − + −  
where powertx is transmission power in dBm, gtx and grx are, respectively, the gains of the 
transmitter and receiver in dBi, ltx and lrx are, respectively, the losses (i.e., from cables, 
connectors, etc.) of the transmitter and receiver in dB, lpath is the total path loss in 
Decibels (dB), and lmisc is the miscellaneous loss (such as fade margin) in dB.  Using 
Equation (1), we define irr  ( )rir  as the received signal strength from (to) a transmitting 
AP node i to (from) coverage region r, and krη  ( )kiη  as the received signal strength from 
a transmitting jammer node k to coverage region r (AP i).  All of the terms in Equation 
(1) are input data, determined by the equipment technical characteristics, except for the 
total path loss lpath, which depends on the position of the transmitting device (a client 
device, AP node iλ , or jammer node kχ ). 
We can use any method for computing lpath, such as a simple inverse-square 
calculation, the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM) (Longley & Rice, 1968), or Hata-COST 
231 (COST, 1999).  We prefer the Terrain Integrated Rough Earth Model (TIREM) of 
Alion Science & Technology Corporation (Alion, 2013).  This model computes path loss 
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by sampling terrain elevation at fixed points between transmitter and receiver.  It 
considers the effects of free space loss, diffraction, and atmospheric absorption and 
reflection, but does not consider foliage, buildings, or other nonterrain obstructions.  
While TIREM is computationally more expensive than simpler models, it provides fairly 
accurate results.  For line-of-sight propagation in commonly-used frequency ranges, 
Eppink and Kuebler (1994) compare TIREM predictions and actual measurements.  They 
find a difference with a mean of –2.8 dB and a standard deviation of 8.9 dB, which is 
very accurate considering the relative simplicity of the model.  In previous work 
(Nicholas & Alderson, 2012), we find TIREM reasonably predicts Cisco Aironet WMN 
AP (Cisco, 2013) performance during field testing. 
We adopt and modify the technique of Nicholas and Alderson (2012) to quantify 
the value of client coverage.  We first calculate in dBm the total interference received at 
region r R∈  and AP node i N∈ .  Following Ståhlberg (2000), we assume the 
cumulative effects of jamming sources on the same channel are additive (in watts) at each 
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Next, we calculate in dB the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) σ  between each 
region r R∈  and AP node i N∈ .  SIR is arguably the most important measure of how 
well a signal is received (Poisel, 2011).  We calculate this quantity in both directions (i to 
r and r to i), as two-way communication is necessary for a client device to successfully 
exchange traffic with an AP, and terrain, obstructions, and the effects of EMI may cause 
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We define τ as the minimum allowable SIR or sensitivity threshold in dB for each 
region r R∈  and AP node i N∈ .  Higher τ values indicate a higher priority or a 
requirement for a higher quality signal and thus greater data transfer rates (we typically 
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use a value of 10 dB).  A positive difference of τ and σ indicates insufficient signal 
quality.  We calculate this client coverage shortfall between region r and AP node i.  We 
penalize the weakest component of the bidirectional link between the AP and region (i.e., 
the link with the greatest coverage shortfall): 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
max ,r ir i riir i N r RCoverage Shortfall t σ t σ+ +∈ ∈≡ − − , 
where ()+ denotes the projection onto the nonnegative real line.  Because a positive 
difference represents inadequate client coverage, we wish to minimize this quantity.  We 
need consider only the minimum coverage shortfall from each AP node i N∈ , as we 
assume each client device will connect only to that AP with the strongest available irσ .  
We sum over all r R∈  to calculate total coverage shortfall, denoted Zcoverage: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }, min max ,coverage r ir i rii Nr RZ Total Coverage Shortfall .λ χ t σ t σ+ +∈∈= ≡ − −∑  
The total coverage shortfall is a function of AP node locations λ  and EMI node 
locations χ .  By allowing only positive terms, we disallow the benefit of transmitting 
received power to any given coverage region. 
B. CALCULATING NETWORK FLOW 
To assess the value of network flow, we first calculate arc capacities between 
each node using the Shannon capacity formula (1949), which establishes a theoretical 
upper bound on transmission capacity in bits per second (bps).  Following Xiao et al. 
(2004), the capacity from AP node i to j in bps is: 
( ) ( )2log 1 , ,ij ijij
j ij
gain
Capacity bandwidth P     i j A
interference loss
 
= + ∀ ∈  
 
 
where bandwidth is channel bandwidth in Hertz and gainij is the sum of the antilog gain 
terms (gtx and grx).  Lossij is the sum of the antilog loss terms (ltx, lrx, lpath, and lmisc) from 
AP node i to j.  Note interferencej is converted to watts; we simplify the notation for 
clarity.  These input data are calculated by the known locations of AP node locations λ  
and jammer node locations χ .  We assume each AP has limited total transmission power 
denoted pi (in watts), and we define Pij to be the fraction of pi used to transmit from i to j.   
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Thus, each AP is additionally constrained by 
:( , )
.ij i




Here, Pij is a decision variable representing the AP-to-AP transmission power from node i 
to node j, whereas the transmission powers for AP-to-client, jammer-to-client, and 
jammer-to-AP powertx is a (constant) input parameter.  By calculating the capacity of 
each arc separately and not considering the effects of handshake dialogues or error 
correction, our model roughly approximates user datagram protocol (UDP) traffic 
transmission (Postel, 1980). 
We measure each individual traffic flow in bps.  We adopt the approach of Xiao 
et al. (2004) to quantify the value of total network flow according to a log-utility function 
that places a zero value on unit flow, positive values on flows greater than one, and 
negative values on flows less than one.  Note that a zero flow has an infinite penalty, and 
therefore there is strong incentive to ensure that each source-destination pair receives 
some flow.  Defining Sid to be the total flow originating at node i and destined for node d, 
we have 
( ) ( )2                             log .                             (6)di
d i d




Collectively, we obtain our version of the Xiao et al. (2004) SRRA problem to calculate 





 i N∈   AP node (alias j) 
 k M∈   jammer node  
 ( , )i j A∈  directed arc (link) 
 d D N∈ ⊆  destination node 
Input Data 
 iˆλ   locations of AP nodes, { }ˆ ˆ ,i i Nλ λ= ∈    [none] 
 ˆkχ   locations of jammer nodes, { }ˆ ˆ ,k k Mχ χ= ∈    [none] 
 pi  maximum total transmission power per AP node,  [watts] 
 bandwidth channel bandwidth      [hertz] 
 
Calculated Data 
 gainij  product of antilog gain terms from i N∈  to j N∈   [none] 
 lossij  product of antilog loss terms from i N∈  to j N∈   [none] 
 interferencej Total received EMI and background noise power  
at j N∈        [watts] 
Decision Variables 
 diS   total flow of traffic from origin i N∈  to destination d D∈  [bps] 
 dijF   traffic flow along arc ( , )i j A∈  to destination d D∈   [bps] 
 ijT   total flow along arc ( , )i j A∈      [bps] 
 ijP   total transmission power along arc ( , )i j A∈    [watts] 
Formulation 
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 Given AP locations λˆ  and jammer locations χˆ , this is a multicommodity 
network flow problem.  The objective function (S0) maximizes the total utility of traffic 
flow between each source-destination pair.  Constraints (S1) ensure balance of flow at 
each AP node.  Constraints (S2) define the total flow along any arc as the sum of all 
traffic flows along that arc.  Constraints (S3) ensure that total flow along any arc is less 
than or equal to the arc capacity.  Constraints (S4) restrict total transmission power at 
each AP.  Constraints (S5-S8) ensure nonnegativity. 
C. OVERALL OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
The overall jammer-cognizant SRRA+C objective function is obtained using a 
linear combination of client coverage (calculated as client coverage shortfall) and 
network flow (calculated via the SRRA problem): 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , , .coverage flowZ Z w Zλ χ λ χ λ χ≡ −  
Combining the value of network coverage with the value of network flow as an elastic 
constraint (Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty, 2006, p. 28) in the objective function ensures the 
problem is continuous, a requirement for the DIRECT algorithm (described below).  We 
use w as a positive scalar representing the relative importance of network flow.  Larger 
values of w indicate network flow is of greater importance and, in general, increase 
network flow by valuing more compact network topologies.  See Nicholas (2009) for a 
detailed sensitivity analysis of w. 
SRRA+C is our simplified model of WMN operations.  There are many higher-
fidelity models available, but with an increase in modeling fidelity, generally comes an 
increase in computational complexity and runtime.  Heeding the warning of Alderson  
et al. (2011) against the use of untested surrogate models for real-world infrastructure 
analysis, in Nicholas and Alderson (2012) we conduct field-testing with SRRA+C 
(without jammers) and find it can provide results that fairly approximate real WMNs. 
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